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Abstract  
 
This paper is concerned with studying the administrative and democratic effects of PPP procurement 
involved in the realisation of two PPP projects in the Greater Ottawa region: Gatineau’s Robert-
Guertin Arena and Ottawa’s Lansdowne Park. First, we review the theory regarding PPPs and 
democratic municipal governance. Second, we propose a normative framework of good governance in 
the municipal sector, tailor-made to infrastructure matters. Third, we critically analyze the decision-
making process and contractual agreements of both projects in order to identify key issues regarding 
infrastructure PPPs in municipalities. We conclude by drawing lessons from the analysis of the two 
projects and discussing the potential implications of our findings. 
 
Key Words: Public-Private Partnerships, democratic governance, value-for-money, public 
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Introduction 
Public-private partnerships (hereafter, PPPs) are increasingly used as a procurement method for 
municipal infrastructure. According to their proponents, PPPs generate significantly greater value for 
money (VFM) than traditional procurement through private sub-contracting and risk-sharing, while 
still allowing for public control of projects. Nevertheless, many PPP projects do not seem to deliver 
the results they promise: total costs are often much greater than those estimated, risks are seldom 
borne by the private partner, and the democratic process often appears to be circumvented in the name 
of the efficiency.  
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The Greater Ottawa region in Canada has recently seen the development of two municipal 
infrastructures projects – the renovation of the Robert-Guertin Arena in Gatineau and the 
reconstruction of Lansdowne Park in Ottawa – which seem particularly appropriate as test cases given 
the tight media scrutiny they faced and the richness of the data available. This paper is therefore 
concerned with studying the administrative and democratic effects of PPP procurement through the 
analysis of the contractual agreements and decision-making processes involved in the realisation of 
both projects.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, it reviews the theory regarding PPPs and democratic 
municipal governance. Second, it will propose a normative framework of good governance in the 
municipal sector, tailor-made to infrastructure matters. The paper then critically analyzes the decision-
making process and contractual agreements involved in Gatineau’s Robert-Guertin Arena and 
Ottawa’s Lansdowne Park in order to identify key issues regarding infrastructure PPPs in 
municipalities. It concludes by drawing lessons from the analysis of the two projects and discuss the 
potential implications of the findings.  
PPPs and good governance: a conceptual clarification  
In this section, we propose a conceptual clarification of the theoretical concepts surrounding the study 
of PPPs. We first present a working definition of PPPs, based on the idea that they are both a 
management tool and a public policy mechanism. We also propose a normative definition of good 
governance in the municipal sector, tailor-made to infrastructure matters. We subscribe to the idea 
that the tools of government are not neutral and that their selection does not constitute a mere 
“technical” choice of implementation (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2006). Rather, we contend that any 
instrument chosen to implement public policy will, in and of itself, create a certain power imbalance 
between the parties involved. Because of their contractual nature, this structuring effect of public 
policy instruments applies very well to PPPs, since they can include various clauses that redistribute 
the risk and benefits.  
PPPs: a definition  
For the purposes of this analysis, PPPs will be defined as “contractual arrangements between a 
government and a private party for the provision of assets and the delivery of services that have been 
traditionally provided by the public sector” (de Bettignies & T. W. Ross, 2004, p. 136). Added to this 
definition is the caveat that these contractual arrangements require considerable longevity (about 25 
years) and complexity in order to distinguish them from other forms of public-private collaboration 
such as concessions or outsourcing. Typically, PPPs will be undertaken for projects such as roads, 
bridges, hospitals, sports centres, prisons, etc. Whether they are used as a procurement mechanism or 
a decision-making and implementation tool, PPPs are expected to secure the economic and financial 
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ends of minimizing the on-budget expenditure of governments on public services and infrastructure 
(Vining and Boardman 2006; Boardman and Vining 2007; Murray 2006; Vining et al 2005). At the 
same time, they are expected to ensure the production and provision of public services and 
infrastructure at a lower cost compared to traditional means of producing them (Boase 1999; de 
Bettignies and Ross 2004; Vining and Boardman 2006). Table 1 below lists the theoretical benefits of 
PPPs in the municipal sector, according to their proponents. 
Table 1 – Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships, according to the City of Ottawa 
Key Benefits of 
P3s for Residents 
• Ability to access new state-of-the-art facilities;  
• Faster design and construction of new facilities;  
• Continued access to programming and services;  
• Projects reflect residents’ priorities;  
• Helps to stimulate economic growth and employment;  
• Minimizes impact on resident taxes;  
• Frees up public funds for other core services 
Key Benefits of 
P3s for the City 
• Shares risk and responsibility with private-sector partners;  
• Addresses key issues such as multiple demands, high expectations and 
pressure to reduce debts ;  
• Accesses new sources of funds and new specialized skills;  
• Delivers capital projects (buildings and infrastructure) faster;  
• Reallocates resources to core areas under government responsibility, thereby 
improving the use of assets ;   
Key Benefits of 
P3s for the 
Private Sector 
• Steady revenue streams linked to secure contracts;  
• New business opportunities;  
• Potential to build on the expertise of government organisations;  
• Sharing of risks.  
     Source: http://www.ottawa.ca/business/bids_contracts/p3/about/index_en.html 
PPPs are essentially contracts for the long-term provision of goods and services. Typically, a PPP 
contract will be signed between a public authority and a private entity (usually a promoter or a 
consortium of many firms, such as banks, contractors, engineers, etc.) and will include the design, 
building, owning, operation and eventually the transfer (to the public entity) of assets by the private 
partner (Koppenjan, 2005; Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005). Often, the project will also 
be financed (at least partially) by the private partner. PPPs rely upon the concept of risk sharing, 
whereby all risks in the project are contractually allocated to the partner most able to manage them 
(Bovaird, 2004). Although the ability to actually transfer the risk has been contested in the critical 
literature on PPPs (Hamel, 2007; Hodge, 2004; Broadbent, Gill, & Laughlin, 2008; Flinders, 2005; 
Froud, 2003), it nonetheless remains part of the rhetoric associated to these arrangements, especially 
in public policy documents. For example, according to the City of Ottawa, PPPs offer the following 
benefits, detailed in table 1 above. With the theoretical sharing of risks also comes the sharing of the 
benefits. PPPs generally include contractual clauses that enable the sharing of benefits. 
Finally, in complete coherence with one the central tenets of New Public Management (NPM) PPPs 
are generally enacted through performance (result-based) specifications, instead of process-based 
requirements, therefore leaving more decisional power to the private partner to design and implement 
the policies. 
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They can therefore be treated as 1) procurement mechanisms (because they usually rely on a public 
call to tender that usually cover the conception, management, maintenance and sometimes financing) 
and 2) as public policy instruments (because they constitute a way to decide upon and implement 
public policies). This acknowledgement of their complex nature will be fundamental to our discussion 
of the way to observe their effect on good governance. 
A normative approach to municipal infrastructure governance 
Many studies have examined the concept of governance from different perspectives. Nevertheless, the 
concept has remained elusive and difficult to concisely define.  Even governance scholars such as 
Bovaird and Löffler (2009) have argued that trying to define governance “seems to open a Pandora’s 
Box” (p. 8).  Farazmand (2004), for instance, describes it through the concept of a chain of network of 
institutions that seek to blend market-type principles with political ideals. Other studies see 
governance from an organisational management and performance perspective, and equate it to “how 
an organisation works with its partners, stakeholders and networks to influence the outcomes of public 
policies” (Bovaird and Löffler, 2009, p. 6). For the purposes of this study, however, governance will 
be defined using Olowu’s (2002) idea that it should be conceived from a “process perspective with 
emphasis on rule of law, accountability, participation, transparency and human and civil rights” (p. 4).  
These concepts are generic and generally accepted in the literature and in theory as constituting 
democratic governance (Olowu, 2002; Pierre, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000). According to 
governance scholars, adherents to these democratic processes and principles should be at the very 
heart of any contractual agreement or relationship between the government and private sector. It can 
be deduced from this framework that good governance comprise two key criteria. The first deals with 
the normative democratic aspect of good governance and includes public sector values such as 
accountability, transparency, public participation, equity and the rule of law. The second comprises 
managing the public and private interface in a manner that ensures the interest of the public is not 
sacrificed in the pursuance of VFM objectives. These two criteria are mutually inclusive and should 
be taken as such.  
With specific reference to PPPs, we have divided these two criteria of democratic governance into 
two categories: administrative (or “contractual”) performance, which is more concerned with issues of 
resource optimisation or VFM, and democratic process, which addresses normative and political 
questions and concerns. They are categorised in Table 2 below. 
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       Table 2 – Two facets of good governance 
Administrative 
Performance 
(Value for Money)  
 
• Efficiency: The production of the highest output possible 
(beneficial effects of public policies) for the lowest quantity of 
input (capital, labour, etc.);  
• Effectiveness: The ability to meet the set objectives;  
• Economy: The procurement of goods and services at the lowest 
possible cost. 
Democratic Process • Transparency: An easy access to information by all, at all points 
during the public policy cycle;  
• Accountability: The necessity for a public policy actors to be held 
accountable for their actions and inactions;  
• Participation: The ability for all stakeholders impacted by a 
decision to have their voices heard.  
 
Based on these normative criteria and in light of our description of the various functions of PPPs, we 
derive a framework based on table 3 below. This framework has the analytical advantage of capturing 
the ambiguous nature of PPPs as public policy instruments and the multifaceted reality of PPPs as 
contractual procurement tools.  
Table 3 – Normative framework for evaluating infrastructure governance through Public-Private Partnerships 
Aspect of a PPP  Main Administrative 
Concerns  
Main Democratic Concerns  
Contractual Procurement 
Mechanism  
Economy Efficiency  • Rule of Law;  
• Accountability (hierarchical/ 
professional);  
• Transparency (openness / 
publicness).  
Public Policy Decision-
Making Instrument  
Effectiveness  • Participation;  
• Accountability (legal/ political);  
• Transparency (accessibility / 
responsiveness).  
Economy, efficiency and effectiveness are usually considered Value for Money (VFM) criteria, as 
they ensure that public monies will be spent appropriately (Demirag et al., 2004; Grimsey & Lewis, 
2005). However, it seems important here to stress that economy and efficiency alone are not sufficient 
to consider a project “a good deal”. Indeed, effectiveness, i.e.: the ability to meet public policy 
objectives, is adamant in reaching good governance from public sector point of view and must not be 
overlooked. In PPPs, VFM is usually deemed to be present because of two factors: the public sector 
comparator exercise that is supposed to verify that PPP projects will only be undertaken if they are 
proven to be better VFM than traditional procurement (de Bettignies & Ross, 2004), and the classic 
liberal assumptions that the private sector will always be more efficient than the public sector (Perry 
& Rainey, 1988). We find these factors inadequate in determining a comparative efficiency between 
PPPs and other mechanisms because they are bias towards private consortiums. Secondly, considering 
the resource and power asymmetries between the public and private consortiums, these two factors 
will always work to the advantage of PPPs. Finally, the high transactional costs associated with PPPs 
renders them out of reach to other partiers thereby reducing competition and all its associated and 
expected benefits.  
Zaato & Hudon                                Public-private partnerships: Greater Ottawa Region 
CJLG June 2015 
 
17
It should be emphasised that these VFM criteria are only one facet of what we consider good 
governance. The democratic process is at the very heart of good governance, as it stems from the 
public nature of the goods and services produced by public administrations. Mostly, democratic 
criteria are concerned with ensuring that elected officials and citizens are the real decision-makers and 
are fighting against the misappropriation of public resources. Accountability, transparency and respect 
for the rule of law on the other hand are adamant in the battle against misappropriation of public 
resources and vehicles for good governance. They mostly come as a package and are particularly 
crucial to PPPs because of their complexity and the need to protect the public interest. Aucoin and 
Heintzman (2000) for instance stress that, “accountability is a cornerstone of public governance and 
management because it requires that those who hold and exercise public authority be held 
accountable” (p.245).  
However, accountability has assumed a higher prominence in PPPs’ discourse due to the high ethical 
expectations expected under PPPs in the provision of public infrastructure because of their 
complexity, costs and life span. This high expectation also emanates from the distrust of politicians 
and the political process by citizens (Romzek & Ingraham, 2000; Thomas, 2007; Barberis, 1998).  
Similarly, transparency also appears as a major democratic concern in both types of PPPs. 
Transparency addresses what the OECD (2005) refers to as the open government concept. This 
concept goes beyond traditional demands for transparency to include accessibility and responsiveness 
in navigating the interface between the government, private business, civil society organisations, the 
media and citizens (OECD, 2005). This new and enhanced transparency requirement is particularly 
relevant and applicable to PPPs because of what is often referred to as non-disclosure provisions in 
PPPs contracts which prevents the public and other relevant institutions from the ability to scrutinise 
these PPP contracts. From all intents and purposes, these non-disclosure provisions are expected to 
prevent the release of contractual details and relevant information that is of interest to the public in 
order to protect their private interests. This practice however is contrary to the letter and spirits of 
good governance in general and the open government concept in particular. Furthermore, the 
accessibility and responsiveness aspect also addresses the service delivery aspect of PPPs especially 
in areas such as user fees and the citizen/client conundrum. This is because to be responsive and 
accessible means that citizens should be treated as sovereign and that cost should not be a barrier to 
accessing public goods and services, PPP or not. It is therefore no coincidence that transparency 
appears on both the contractual and public policy aspects of PPPs. 
Using this framework, we now turn to the analysis of two PPPs in the Ottawa region. 
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PPPs in the Greater Ottawa Region 
In this section, we critically examine the failed project of Gatineau’s Robert-Guertin Centre1 and the 
current plans for renovating Ottawa’s Lansdowne Park. For these two projects, we study both the 
contractual arrangements’ and the decision-making process’s influence on good governance. 
Gatineau’s Robert-Guertin Centre 
In the spring of 2009, the City of Gatineau decided to rebuild the Robert-Guertin arena – where the 
Olympiques, a junior-level professional hockey team played all its game – by entering into a PPP 
agreement with a Consortium composed of a local contractor and the owner of the Olympiques. This 
decision was taken by the city council after receiving a proposal from the consortium promising 
renovate and lease the arena to the City for a period of 25 years (once the renovations are completed). 
The Robert-Guertin arena, built in 1957, needs to be completely renovated in order to accommodate 
high-level hockey games (Gatineau, 2010). 
In February 2007, a study conducted by the engineering firm Dessau-Soprin analyzed various options 
for the Robert-Guertin Centre (RGC), including moving to another location, demolishing and building 
and new arena, renovating the current arena, entering into a PPP contract, etc (Gatineau, 2010; Le 
Droit, 2007). The report concluded that the best option would be to build a new 6000-seat, two-rink 
arena on the current site of the Robert-Guertin Centre, financed through a PPP agreement. In the 
months that followed, the city council voted for a scaled-down project containing only one ice rink, 
but still using the PPP model. 
In April 2008, the City of Gatineau, hired a new Director General, Robert Weemaes, who had 
previously worked at the City of Repentigny where, amongst other things, he had overseen the 
construction of an arena using the PPP model. Mr. Weemaes was generally seen as a very pro-PPP 
municipal manager (Duquette, 2008). Finally, in the spring of 2009, the Consortium proposed a 
project in which the City would cede, through an emphyteutic lease, the lot on which the Robert-
Guertin Centre is built. In return, the Consortium would renovate the arena for a cost of $28M and 
lease the renovated building to the City for 25 years (Gatineau, 2010). Table 4, below, summarises the 
details of the agreement that were leaked to the media. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The information presented in this case study comes from a series of newspaper articles by Pierre Bergeron, Patrick 
Duquette and Catherine Lamontagne from Le Droit newspaper, as well as from the City of Gatineau’s 2010 Auditor General 
Report (Gatineau, 2010). The detailed references of all the documents cited can be found in the “References” section of this 
article. 
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         Table 4 – Contractual characteristics of the Robert-Guertin PPP Project 
Financial Obligations by 
the City of Gatineau  
The City must pay, monthly:  
• The capital and interest payment on the loan contracted by the 
Consortium ($28M at 5.25% = $167,799 a month);  
• Monthly management fees of $120,000 a month;  
• Payments of $40,000 to a maintenance reserve fund starting at the 
beginning of the fifth year;  
• Taxes and insurance payments.  
Other Relevant Clauses  • The reserve fund, although owned by the City, is managed by the 
consortium, thus raising the issue of the selection process of the 
subcontractors;  
• The contract is “net-net-net”, which means that all taxes and 
insurance are to be paid by the City. This is fairly common in most 
commercial real estate leases;  
• The City has the ability to renegotiate the terms of the loans;  
• A clause enables the owner of the Olympiques to move the team to 
another city for a penalty of $250,000.  
Source: Contract between the City of Gatineau and 7124358 Canada inc., approved by city council on 
March 27th, 2009 (Gatineau, 2009) 
On March 27th, 2009, the City Council was asked to vote on the agreement after limited debate at the 
City Council. The councillors were presented with the preliminary framework agreement only a 
couple of hours before the vote were called. No public consultations were undertaken and there were 
no possible modifications to the contract. The urgency of the situation was invoked – the risk of 
losing the hockey team was alluded to, as well as the decrepit state of the installations (Lamontagne, 
2009). It can also be presumed that such urgency was linked to the fact that the mayor was up for re-
election on November 1st, 2009 and that signing the contract before the campaign would have been 
politically very popular (Bergeron, 2009). Upon noticing the growing uproar, the Minister for 
Municipalities, Regions and Territory Organisation of Quebec, as per her prerogative, put a halt to the 
project. She cited the need for a call to public tender as a reason to stop the project (Duquette & 
Lamontagne, 2009).  
The PPP structure and the nature of the contract 
We now turn to an analysis of the governance issues linked to specific clauses of the PPP contract. 
First, economical procurement is at stake, as there seems to be a fundamental problem with the way 
the bidding was undertaken. Indeed, in multi-bidder procurement, the lowest cost is deemed to be 
obtained precisely because of the competition effect between bidders in an unconstrained market. 
Therefore, in a situation of oligopoly of monopoly (where competition is low or non-existent), prices 
should be negotiated based on previous experiences or similar projects (Bajari, McMillan & Tadelis, 
2008). In the case of the Robert-Guertin Centre, this was clearly not the case, as the City accepted the 
only proposal that it received. Questions thus arise regarding how competitive the price paid by the 
City was. Furthermore, the fact that the loan is contracted by the Consortium – which presumably has 
a worse credit rating than the City – would mean that the rent payment by City would contain a higher 
interest component than if the loan had been contracted directly by the City. This could be beneficial 
if the City was willing to pay a premium to protect itself against financial risk. However, it seems 
reasonable to think that if the Consortium has financial problem, the risk would immediately be 
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shifted back to the City, which would have no other choice to either help out financially the 
consortium or buy back the arena itself.  
Let us also recall that PPPs, like other instruments of public action, tend to induce a power 
relationship between the actors involved. We contend that some specific issues in this agreement have 
the effect of shifting power away from the City and toward the Consortium:  
• No offsetting benefits for the additional risk incurred by the City. It can be argued that this 
specific PPP causes greater risk for the City than traditional procurement does, while not 
providing very little shared benefits. Indeed, traditional procurement would have had the City 
take control over a number of smaller, fragmented contracts instead of signing one all-
encompassing contract with a single, not vetted company. Furthermore, the contract includes 
no profit-sharing mechanism or penalties for underperformance, as would be the case for 
traditional PPPs;  
• Skewed penalties for cancellation. A clause enables the owner of the Olympiques to move the 
team to another city for a penalty of $250,000. This amount can be considered fairly marginal, 
given the profit expectations of a hockey team in the LHJMQ. This seems unduly risky for the 
City given the low penalty faced by the owner and the consequences – which would be to 
leave the City with an empty arena – of such an action for the City;  
• Opaque cost structure. The $120,000 management seems very arbitrary given the fact that no 
details were given regarding what it contained. This raises the issue of the different levels of 
transparency and disclosure that are expected in the public and private sectors, respectively, 
and of what this implies in terms power imbalance.  
Another important aspect of procurement, which touches upon the most basic understanding of the 
rule of law and of transparency, is the way subcontracts are granted. Indeed, under traditional 
procurement, any repair to the arena that would cost more than $50,000 would need to go through a 
call to tender process. Under the PPP agreement, the reserve fund (contributed to by the City, but 
managed by the Consortium) is used to pay for those repairs (Gatineau, 2009). But because it is 
managed by the private partner, it could be used as a way to circumvent the call to tender process by 
enabling the Consortium to choose the contractor itself, or to do the work in-house for a price that 
cannot be determined through competition or negotiation (thus presumably higher). The same point 
can be made about unionised labourers: PPPs could be used as a way to avoid dealing with the City’s 
unionised workforce by having the Consortium hire the maintenance employees (Duquette, 2009a).  
What can be learned from all this? First, that PPP are extremely sensitive to the quality of the 
contract. PPPs, because they are essentially procurement contracts, run the risk of producing lopsided 
results if the contract is not written properly from the beginning. Furthermore, because the contracts 
are typically very long and complex and cover just about every aspect of a project, a small 
imprecision can have very important consequences regarding risks and benefits, usually to the 
detriment of the public sector. This also stresses the need for public sector expertise to be on a level 
playing field with firms that often have a lot of experience in PPPs. Second, that the bidding process 
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is of first and foremost importance in ensuring the lowest cost and the best quality, especially in a 
context where projects are tailor-made to meet the infrastructure needs of a municipality. Third, that 
there are dangerous democratic consequences of applying a private sector frame of mind to public 
management, especially with regards to the transparency and accountability requirements. 
However, beyond the problematic issues with the very nature of the contract, we contend that there 
are also democratic problems concerning the decision-making process. 
The decision-making process 
Our first observation is related to the hybrid nature of PPPs, as a procurement tool and a decision-
making mechanism. Indeed, there seems to be a complete blurring of two simultaneous decisions that 
need to be made: the decision to use PPP as a mode of procurement, and the decision regarding the 
nature of the project. It could be argued that PPPs constitute only one option for procurement – the 
other one being traditional procurement – and that, therefore, the same project could be done as a 
traditional project or as a PPP. This is precisely what happens with PPPs managed at the Quebec 
provincial level, where the use of PPP procurement must be justified through an exercise called Public 
Sector Comparator, whereby traditional and PPP procurement are compared and the most economical 
solution is chosen. Although there are well-known transparency and instrumentalisation issues 
surrounding this exercise (Rouillard & Hudon, 2009; Khadaroo, 2008), we feel it nevertheless should 
be part of an honest public debate over procurement.  
In the case of the Robert-Guertin Centre, the Public Sector Comparator was never done. The debate 
on the nature of project also suffered from being drowned into the debate over procurement and 
would certainly have benefited from stronger public scrutiny and greater transparency. The “aura of 
mystery” surrounding PPPs can in part be blamed for this, especially in municipalities whose 
politicians and civil servants are not too familiar with this mode of procurement. It seems that PPPs 
are a “buzzword”, poorly defined and poorly understood, that make politically-sensitive decisions 
even more political. The fact that the new Director General, Mr. Weemaes, was initially presented as 
a person that would help the City undertake PPPs certainly supports the idea that public debate over 
the relevance and effectiveness of this mode of procurement was skipped (Duquette, 2008). 
Our second observation concerns issues of participation. In the case of the Robert-Guertin Centre, 
there seems to have been an instrumentalisation of the Dessau-Soprin report. The report was indeed 
the main justification provided by the City for undertaking the project as a PPP. The City also claimed 
that the report indicated that no company, except for the Consortium was interested in bidding for the 
project. Nonetheless, when the proposal by the Consortium was made public, two companies 
(including Dessau-Soprin) indicated that, had a public call to tender been issued, they would have 
submitted a proposal (Duquette, 2009b). PPP procurement therefore seems to have played a role in 
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limiting public participation and debate, by “clouding up” the decision making and by 
instrumentalizing, through selective information diffusion, expert advice. 
Below, the analysis will shift to the second PPP project in the study; the Lansdowne Park 
redevelopment in Ottawa. 
Lansdowne Park at a crossroads 
On 2nd September 2009, staff of the City of Ottawa and a private firm, Ottawa Sports and 
Entertainment Group (hereafter, OSEG) presented a proposed plan based on a financial partnership to 
city council. According to the promoters (Ottawa, 2009), the plan:  
• Involved the redesign and redevelopment of Lansdowne Park; 
• Aimed at developing the historic park into a green, sustainable urban outdoor venue with 
sports facilities for soccer, football and hockey and serve as a modern meeting, socialising 
and even commercial point;  
• Involved putting to good use an old historic relic and maximising its value for the citizens of 
Ottawa. 
The initial plan gained the approval of city staff and the National Capital Commission (NCC) and was 
also approved by City Hall but ran into some legal challenges. However, in July 2011, a judge in 
Ottawa ruled against the Friends of Lansdowne Park, who sued the city to stop the project because 
they claimed the City of Ottawa acted in bad faith, violated its own procurement by-laws, and 
illegally favoured OSEG (Superior Court of Justice, 2011). Following the ruling, the City of Ottawa 
and OSEG have begun work on the almost $300-million project. How did we get here and what were 
the real issues between the litigants? And more importantly, what does this project mean for future 
PPP projects in Ottawa? We examine these questions below beginning with a brief historical review 
of the project. 
Re-examining the Lansdowne Park Project PPP arrangement 
The Lansdowne Park Project (LPP) is premised on a PPP arrangement that is aimed at tapping into 
private capital for execution of the project. To facilitate and enhance the progress and management of 
the project, a proposed municipal corporation, to be known as Municipal Services Corporation 
(MSC), will be created and will be wholly owned by the City of Ottawa (Ottawa, 2009). The MSC 
will be a shared capital corporation, operate at an arm’s length from city council and have an 
autonomous personality. This independent MSC will then enter into a contract with OSEG for the 
redevelopment of the park. Under the proposed business model arrangement, the City will transfer its 
share of the capital and funds for developing the stadium, the arena and the associated cost of the 
parking lot at a total cost of $129.3 million plus the land for up to 30 years to MSC for onward 
transfer to OSEG (Ottawa, 2009). OSEG on the other hand will provide the other half of the cost of 
the first phase, estimated at $125 million as part of its equity share (OAG, 2009).  
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It is also proposed that MSC will enter into a 30 year lease agreement with OSEG to undertake the 
design, redevelopment, construction and operation of the project. OSEG will set up a fund for 
maintaining the building in a ‘like new’ position before transferring it to the city at the end of the 30 
years lease period. Thus, prima facie, this proposal represents a win-win PPP for both parties (Ottawa, 
2009). The city gets to upgrade and redevelop the park, generate employment and taxes while sharing 
the costs. OSEG on the other hand gets to partner the city, share the cost, assumes operational 
responsibilities for 30 years, at the end of which it would have recouped the $125 million it invested 
and made some profits (Ottawa, 2009). This arrangement seems simple enough as a straight business 
plan between two partners sharing costs, risks and profits. However, a critical examination of the 
proposed financial arrangements shows this contract to be lopsided, favouring OSEG and 
disadvantaging the city. 
The PPP structure and the nature of the contract 
The entire project is divided into different phases and structured around different financial 
arrangements between MSC and OSEG:  
• The first part is the construction of the stadium and the arena. Under the proposed financial 
arrangement, $110 million in cash comprised of avoided budgetary cost during the 
construction period (approximately $8.4 million) and $101.8 million debt will be transferred 
from MSC to OSEG for the redevelopment of the stadium and the arena.  
• The city will therefore virtually contribute to the cost of redeveloping and reconstruction of 
the stadium and the arena;  
• MSC will contribute $19.3 million and OSEG will contribute $17.5 million for the 
construction of the parking lot. OSEG will maintain and operate the parking lot;  
• OSEG will also invest $80.1 million for the construction of 300,000 square feet of retail shops 
(Ottawa, 2009; OAG, 2009) 
Thus, in phase one of the LPP, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) report on the process indicate 
that the city will contribute a total of $119.3 million while OSEG contributes a total of $117.2 million 
(OAG, 2009). Table 5 below shows the financial contribution from both parties.  
           Table 5 - Phase 1 Capital Costs ($ million) 
 
City (MSC) OSEG 
Stadium/Infra./Bldg./Lawn $110 - 
Parking Garage  $19.3 $17.5 
Retail/Cinema/Infra./Lawn - $80.1 
CFL/OHL Franchise Fee/Start-up Costs - $19.6 
Phase 1 Total  $129.3  $117.2 
           Source: OAG (2009) 
The proposed phase two of the project will see OSEG investing almost $95 million for the 
construction of a residential, office and hotel spaces. In general, OSEG will assume all construction 
risks associated with the redevelopment of the project. Such risks include design, schedule delays, 
Zaato & Hudon                                Public-private partnerships: Greater Ottawa Region 
CJLG June 2015 
 
24
budget overruns, construction defects and quantity estimates errors. However, OSEG will not pay any 
rent for this investment for 30 years.  
Profits from the project will be shared in the form of what experts in an academic study of the 
proposal refer to as a ‘waterfall arrangement’ (Lee & Tiger, 2009). In their study of the project on 
behalf of the Old Ottawa South Community Association (OSCA), Ian Lee of Carleton University 
Business School and Michael Tiger, an economist, described the ‘waterfall agreement’ as the priority 
ranking of cash flow distribution between the partners in the project. It is a speculative exercise based 
on projections (Lee & Tiger, 2009). The formula is a hierarchical arrangement that determines who 
gets paid, when and how. The current arrangement will ensure that OSEG gets paid first and gets most 
of the ‘water’, reduce the speed and volume of the water to the next level and ensures that when it is 
the city’s turn, the speed and volume of the water will be slow (Lee & Tiger, 2009). Furthermore, 
under the closed system which considers cash flows from the entire site and not only a single 
segment, additional net flow will be distributed as per Table 6 below. 
           Table 6 - Profit Distribution between OSEG and City/MSC 
PROFIT DISTRIBUTION  
Level 1  $1.5 million at 2013  Annual payment to the City/MSC for life-cycle maintenance of the 
new site.  
Level 2  $1.6 million at 2013  Annual interest payment of 8% to OSEG on $19.6 million in franchise fees and start-up costs for the CFL and OHL teams.  
Level 3      Not specified  Annual principle payments by 2014 to OSEG for 30-year return on $30 million equity (rate of return not specified).  
Level 4  $1.6 million at 2013  Annual interest payment of 8% to City for return on deemed equity 
of $20 million (value of land).  
Level 5     Not specified  Any remaining revenue after Levels 1-4 are met; to be split evenly between OSEG and City.  
           Source: OAG 2009 
The waterfall arrangement essentially ensures that OSEG gets paid first and more, even though they 
invested little. It further ensures that the $80 million invested by OSEG is a priority in the waterfall 
arrangement and will be paid first (Lee & Tiger, 2009). Thus, while the city comes first in the 
hierarchy of most contributions and has most to lose, it comes last in the sharing of revenue. The 
waterfall thus makes sure that the private interest is protected, defended and secured before and 
beyond the public interest even though the public is contributing more for the whole project. 
Furthermore, the closed financial system ensures that OSEG gets paid on interest in areas like the 
stadium in which it did not invest. The most intriguing aspect is that under the waterfall arrangement, 
OSEG even gets paid first in the sectors that only the city invested and has risks. Concomitantly, 
OSEG will lease the retail shops, hotel and office spaces for 70 years (and not the 30 years stated) and 
in addition pay no rent for 30 years (Lee & Tiger, 2009). In short, the city will assume most, if not all 
the cost while OSEG makes the most profit for a period of 30 years before the city can begin to expect 
any returns. Both the waterfall arrangement and the closed financial system ensures that the city can 
only make a profit after OSEG has recouped all its investments and made profits for30 years. If these 
Zaato & Hudon                                Public-private partnerships: Greater Ottawa Region 
CJLG June 2015 
 
25
financial arrangements are one sided, there are no guarantees for protecting the city and tax payer in 
the governance structure of the LPP.  
Re-examining the decision-making process 
Under the proposed arrangement, an MSC will be created and empowered as an independent 
corporation to work with OSEG. As Lee and Tiger (2009) explain, the proposed MSC will be 
completely independent from City Council after it is formed. That means that there will be no vertical 
or horizontal accountability once the MSC is formed and the business contract with OSEG signed. 
Considering all the financial and political risks involved in such a project, the lack of adequate 
accountability and transparency assurances is both problematic and a blatant disregard for the tenets 
of good governance expected in a liberal democracy. This is because the only people that will benefit 
from such an accountability-free arrangement are the private business partners, because once City 
Council loses its right to hold the MSC accountable, the democratic process is sacrificed. This will 
mean that city council cannot hold either the MSC or OSEG to account for shirking and other 
opportunistic behaviour due to information asymmetry inherent in a principal-agent arrangement such 
as this one (Wallis et al., 2007; Lane, 1996). 
Also, the choice of single source funding or the refusal to open up the process to competitive bidding 
violates federal, provincial and even the City of Ottawa’s own policy on public-private partnerships 
(Lee & Tiger, 2009). Competition is expected to reduce cost, improve efficiency and create a level 
playing field for all players. By choosing a single source bid, the city sacrifices its neutrality and 
compromises the public interest. Such a move creates the impression of a potential conflict of interest 
between city staff and OSEG. It therefore opens the city staff to accusations of bribery, corruption, 
nepotism and favouritism in the award of contracts. Such accusations do not only question the 
legitimacy of the project, it could significantly reduce public confidence, trust and support not only in 
the project, but also in the entire governance system. 
Apart from these accountability deficits, a proposed public consultation process only succeeded in 
providing very minimal, simplistic and highly inaccurate information to the unsuspecting public. For 
instance, while the City of Ottawa will only begin to make any returns or dividends after 30 years 
under the waterfall arrangements, OSEG will begin making profits as soon as the projects commences 
and profits begin coming in. But this information is not told to the public. Also, before the city can get 
a single income from this project, OSEG would have fully recovered all its cost despite the 
disproportionate contributions from the city. Thus, the public consultation process seems like a public 
relation campaign rather than a commitment to engage, involve and enlist the contributions and by 
implication support of citizens. Also, another key requirement is that OSEG will bring a CFL and the 
Ottawa 67s to Lansdowne Park. Yet, even though an integral component of the project is to bring 
these teams and sporting events to Ottawa, there is no guarantee that they will be there for the 30 year 
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period of the lease (Lee & Tiger, 2009). Therefore, the CFL and the Ottawa 67s team could leave the 
city and the park after just 10 or even 5 years appearance. Such a key detail however is not presented 
to the public, de facto shifting a part of the financial risk to the city. 
A project of this magnitude has intended and unintended consequences. The intended consequences 
are the posited claims for the project. These include the redevelopment of the project, the shopping 
malls, the football and hockey teams, hotel, office and accommodation facilities. While all these seem 
good, they obscure the unintended consequences which are equally important and deserve equal 
attention. Some of these unintended consequences include potential traffic deadlock on an already 
congested Bank street, the concentration of retail shops in the city centre instead of the periphery, 
potential bankruptcies of businesses on Bank street as all the human traffic will be redirected to 
Lansdowne Park and could potentially cannibalise businesses and their sales in the downtown core 
(Lee & Tiger, 2009). Not presenting these unintended consequences to citizen’s smacks of deception, 
a cover up and not consultation, participation and involvement. 
We contend that, as a policy instrument, the current PPP arrangement between OSEG and the City of 
Ottawa fails because of the nature, magnitude and value of the good governance trade-offs involved in 
the current arrangement. As we have demonstrated throughout the analysis, these guarantees are either 
absent or inadequate. This is clearly corroborated by public opinion polls from the feedback on the 
public consultations that were supposed to inform, engage and get the support and approval of 
residents. A Nanos Opinion Research indicated that about half of the residents polled (49.6%) were 
ambivalent to the project. A further 22.5% of residents were completely against it while only 18.7% 
percent were for it (Cook, 2009). While it will be a dereliction of duty and irresponsible leadership to 
base public policies simply on public opinion, we think that these results adds extra value to our 
argument that the project does not have the support of citizens because of the convoluted nature of the 
project, the numerous unanswered questions and the good governance deficits involved. 
Discussion and conclusion 
In this section, we draw lessons from the analysis of the two projects and discuss the potential 
theoretical implications of our findings. Both the Robert-Guertin Centre and the Lansdowne Park 
projects serve as fairly typical, real-life cases of municipal infrastructure projects done through PPP 
procurement. As such, they can serve as a basis for critical examination which could, in term, lead to 
a better understanding of the governance issues surrounding PPP procurement. Our verdict is that 
from both a contractual procurement mechanism and as a public policy tool, the Gatineau and Ottawa 
PPPs perform rather poorly. This poor performance has to do both with the nature of the PPP 
agreements, as well as the contingent environment in which the projects were developed. As in most 
public policy matters, success (and failure) is conditioned both by the effectiveness of the tools used, 
but also by the context and the way in which they were used. These lessons therefore should not 
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constitute general claims about PPPs but, rather, observations concerning two specific cases that can 
be used as starting point to better understand this governance phenomenon. 
If the relative efficiency (time- and process-wise) of both procurement efforts seems to indicate 
greater performance, we cannot disregard the fact that they were done without a call to tender – which 
in turn has impact on the ability to secure economic procurement. From a democratic perspective, the 
absence of competition is illegal for projects of this magnitude and contributes to a lack of openness 
and publicness, both of which are essential components of transparency in procurement.  
As public policy mechanisms, the two PPPs seem to be aligned fairly well with public policy needs 
(both projects were fairly popular with the general public), but the way they were structured renders 
political accountability difficult: Gatineau’s project was hardly debated by city council while 
Ottawa’s project is governed through an agency that is at arm’s length from the municipal 
government. Furthermore, the very logic behind PPPs, in keeping with one of the most frequent 
criticism made to NPM, makes accountability difficult by essentially privatizing not only 
implementation, but also decision making.  
The way in which both projects were undertaken highlights many important findings concerning the 
administrative and democratic effects of PPP procurement. It is to these findings that we turn next. 
PPPs and administrative performance 
Administrative performance can be observed by proxy through the criteria of efficiency, effectiveness 
and economy, and tries to ensure VFM. Based on the analysis above however, we are in a position to 
state that neither contractual agreement guarantees the cities of Ottawa or Gatineau VFM. First, when 
we consider the competition effect, it is easy to conclude that both cities are probably left worse off 
because of the single-bidder process. Indeed, they both could have gained better VFM either through 
open competitive bidding or direct public procurement. 
Second, VFM issues arise regarding the risk and benefit sharing. Indeed, both contracts do not 
guarantee an adequate sharing of benefits (because of the lopsidedness of the “waterfall scheme” for 
Ottawa, and because of specific clauses in the contract for Gatineau), even if risk-sharing is used as 
the justification for the very existence of a PPP. Furthermore, the non-disclosure clauses in the 
agreement, which make restricts proper risk evaluation, are particularly problematic, given that risk 
sharing, which is touted as one of the relative advantages of PPP over traditional means of 
procurement, is impeded by the inability to properly evaluate risk. 
Third, regarding the issue of effectiveness (i.e.: the ability to meet public policy objectives), it seems 
relevant to wonder if the neighbourhood-wide negative impacts of the Lansdowne Park project –such 
as the negative impacts on surrounding businesses and on traffic levels– might just not outweigh the 
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benefits. This highlights the very fundamental contradictions that arise when trying to combine a 
micro-level, private sector mindset geared toward short/medium term profitability and project-based 
management with a macro-level, public sector concern for city-wide objectives and long-term societal 
benefits. 
PPPs and the democratic governance process  
The democratic conduct of procurement is observed through the criteria of public participation, 
accountability and transparency. First, let us notice the blurring of the decision-making induced by the 
use of the PPP. Indeed, there seems to have been no debate regarding the procurement mechanism, 
and the debate seems to have concentrated on the project itself. However, given the well-known issues 
concerning PPPs, a diligent and open democratic debate should have considered the relevance and the 
trade-offs of using this mode of procurement.  
Second, in both projects, electoral concerns seem to play an extremely important role in shaping the 
public debate, enabling the various actors to invoke the importance of “getting this deal done before 
the elections”. The sensitivity of PPP to electoral concerns, perhaps even more so than traditional 
procurement due to the magnitude of the projects, has negative effects on the democratic process.  
Third, the deliberate distortion of details and the secrecy surrounding final contractual obligations in 
Lansdowne Park and, to a lesser extent, the Robert-Guertin Centre have a clear effect on transparency 
and public accountability, but also on the ability of citizens to participate actively in the public debate.  
Finally, the closeness of the two municipalities and impending elections in both municipalities which 
served as policy windows and avenues for political activity and opportunism, arm us with enough 
evidence to proceed and make informed and educated pronouncements and determinations of the 
potential fate of the project.  
*          *          * 
In light of these case analyses, we cannot but agree with Flinders (2005), who mentions that “PPPs 
represent a Faustian bargain in that forms of PPP may deliver efficiency gains and service 
improvements in some policy areas but these benefits may involve substantial political and 
democratic costs” (p. 216). But we also note that in order for these efficiency gains to exist, PPP 
procurement needs to be done in a way that is respectful of:  
• the normal municipal procurement process, which involves public call to tenders, a concern 
for the economic acquisition of goods and services and the respect of the rules and regulations 
of purchasing;  
• the normal policy-making process, which requires the involvement of public policy actors in 
the planning, decision-making, and implementation of any given project, as well as the ability 
to hold those actors accountable for the decisions they make.  
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We also lament the fact that efficiency gains are too often seen as a trade-off to democratic principles, 
when in fact they should be seen as two sides of the same coin. One cannot therefore “sacrifice” 
accountability and transparency in the name of greater efficiency and effectiveness, because true 
effectiveness (i.e.: the ability to meet public policy objectives) would include democratic concerns as 
an end in themselves. 
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